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Abstract
In this paper, we reflect on our experience as science and technology studies
(STS) researchers who were members of the working group that produced A
Synthetic Biology Roadmap for the UK in 2012. We explore how this initiative
sought to govern an uncertain future and describe how itwas successfully used
to mobilize public funds for synthetic biology from the UK government. We
discussour attempts to incorporate the insights and sensibilities of STS into the
policy process and why we chose to use the concept of responsible research
and innovation to do so. We analyze how the roadmapping process, and the
final report, narrowed and transformed our contributions to the roadmap.
We show how difficult it is for STS researchers to influence policy when our
ideas challenge deeply entrenched pervasive assumptions, framings, and
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narratives about how technological innovation necessarily leads to economic
progress, about public reticence as a roadblock to that progress, and about
the supposed separation between science and society.Weendby reflecting on
the constraints under which we were operating from the outset and on the
challenges for STS in policy.
Keywords
responsible research and innovation, futures, public acceptability,
governance
Introduction
On July 11 2013, DavidWilletts, thenUKMember of Parliament andMinister
of State for Universities and Science, stood at a podium at Imperial College
London at the Sixth InternationalMeeting on Synthetic Biology (SB6.0) hold-
ingupa copyof a report entitledASynthetic BiologyRoadmap for theUK as he
announced millions of pounds of government funding for the field. Some
members of the audience clapped. A few cheered. Excited delegates tweeted
photos of the minister at the podium: “the Government is in the house,” “the
Minister is here,” and “Total of £126Minvested in synthetic biology by theUK
Government!” A few minutes earlier, two young women had silently distrib-
uted a pamphlet with an intentionally inflammatory image of Willetts, two
high-profile synthetic biologists and the Shell logo,1 caught in the tentacles of a
sinister monster, which was also instantly tweeted (Agapakis 2013). Mean-
while, the two authors of this paper sat in the audience feeling rather uncom-
fortable; and by the end of that day, after a session on responsible research and
innovation (RRI) organized byone of us (J.C.) and chaired by the other (C.M.),
we felt despondent.
In this paper, we discuss our involvement in the UK Synthetic Biology
Roadmap and explain why we felt downhearted on that hot summer’s day in
South Kensington. We start by reviewing science and technology studies
(STS) perspectives on how to govern uncertain technological futures and on
the increasing use of roadmaps as a tool for doing so. We then review
relevant literature on STS in policy and reflect on our methodology in light
of this literature. The main body of this paper describes our participation in
the roadmapping process. In the conclusions, we reflect on what lessons we
can draw from our experience for STS researchers involved in policy-
making.
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Governing the Future
STS research has drawn attention to three features of attempts to govern the
future that are important for our discussion of theUKSynthetic BiologyRoad-
map. First, the future is always uncertain, so attempts to predict or control the
development of any technology are necessarily fraught with difficulties. Col-
lingridge’s “dilemma of control” was a pioneering attempt to engage with this
unpredictability from an STS perspective. The dilemma arises because, in its
early stages, it is hard to predict how a technology is likely to develop, so it is
difficult to intervene and shape it, although the power to control and influence
its development is high. However, once the consequences of the technology
become apparent, the power to control its development is limited because it
will have become part of an entangled material, economic, and social fabric
(Collingridge 1980). Other authors have built upon Collingridge’s dilemma to
demonstrate how innovation is an irreversibly branching evolutionary process
that is “shaped” by or “coproduced” with society and that choices between
alternative technological pathways tend to get closed down over time. As a
result, not all that is scientifically realistic, technically practicable, economi-
cally feasible, or socially viable will be historically realizable. Technologies
are path-dependent and can become “locked-in” (Bijker and Law 1992; David
1985; Jasanoff 2004; Stirling 2008). The (often misunderstood) lesson of the
Collingridge dilemma of control is not that we should give up on attempts to
govern the future but that it is necessary to act while acknowledging uncer-
tainty. Collingridge (1980, 12) argues that instead of focusing on better pre-
dictions, we should develop a “theory of decision making under ignorance”.
Since prediction and control will not be possible, it becomes necessary to
incorporate flexibility, resilience, and diversity into technological develop-
ments to avoid lock-in.
Second, as literature on the sociology of expectations demonstrates,
discourses about the future are not mere speculation, they are performative:
they have real effects in the present because actions in the present are made
legitimate through promises about the future (Brown 2003). If a technology
is expected to succeed, people will invest (time, energy, political support,
finances) into it, meaning it is more likely to succeed. Expectations also
attach hopes and concerns to new technologies, in this way embedding
specific roles for different actors, and thus influencing what the technology
becomes. This leads to our third feature, which is that what may appear to
be merely technological projections embody value judgments, since they
are visions about a future that is desirable. All discussion of the future is
therefore normative, yet this is often overlooked in scientific and policy
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discourse. Although prediction and control are not possible, it is possible to
have a discussion of the visions, values, and purposes that drive technolo-
gical development. These intentions are always in the present, even if their
future consequences are not. This is a key justification, from an STS per-
spective, for encouraging the participation of diverse groups of people in the
governance of science and technology. As Wilsdon and Willis (2004, cover
page) put it “[t]he task is to make visible the invisible, to expose to public
scrutiny the assumptions, values and visions that drive science.”
Technology Roadmaps
Technology roadmaps are onemechanism for governing the future. Theywere
first developed in the 1980s in the private sector and were taken up by the
public sector in the 2000s as a tool to foster the competitiveness of specific
industries. The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors
(ITRS) has become an exemplar for technology roadmaps. Reissued every
year or two between 2001 and 2015, it has coordinated the actions of compet-
ing firms across the semiconductor industry and has enabled Moore’s Law to
become a self-fulfilling prophecy by guiding technological and investment
decisions (MacKenzie 1996). When roadmaps are developed in other fields,
the success of the ITRS is often in the background.As pointed out in aNuffield
Council report on emerging biotechnologies: “having a technology roadmap
conveys the impression of purpose and inevitability in the way that a new
technology is expected to unfold, and perhaps also seeks to associate the new
technologywith people’s experience of rapid change in computer technology”
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012, 102).
Like other ways of governing the future of technologies, roadmaps are
performative. They aim not just to inform decision-making but also to
“weave a picture of the future that attempts to galvanise actions in the
present” (McDowall 2012, 531). As McDowall notes, they combine and
conflate three ways of engaging with the future: expectations (what is likely
to happen?), desires (what is hoped will happen?), and promises (what will
be made to happen?). Another important feature of roadmaps is that who is
involved has a large influence on the path sketched out for the future and
also on the legitimacy of the roadmap. In line with the STS work discussed
above, McDowall (2012, 534) argues that “roadmaps that are developed
through processes that are broadly inclusive and participatory will have a
greater claim to setting out a legitimately desirable future pathway”. How-
ever, roadmaps often involve a narrow range of participants from industrial,
academic, and policy worlds who are closely associated with current
4 Science, Technology, & Human Values XX(X)
developments in the field and are seeking to attract resources. McDowall
maintains that such actors are likely to offer optimistic, even hyperbolic,
accounts of the future of the technology. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that roadmaps usually purport to present a consensus view and identify
only one road: a supposedly shared vision of the future. This is arguably
essential to inculcate a sense of purpose and to assemble resources as “a
confident, prescriptive roadmap developed on the basis of a consensus of
relevant (and powerful) actors will have most influence” (McDowall 2012,
533). However, since “actors in the innovation system are unwilling to
subscribe to overly diverse, pluralist and contested pathways” (McDowall
2012, 534), this closes down deliberation about technology choice. We
discuss below how these features of roadmaps played out in the UK Syn-
thetic Biology Roadmap, but first we address the literature on STS in policy
and its implications for our methodology.
STS in Policy and Methodological Implications
This paper builds on ongoing discussions about the role that social scien-
tists, and STS researchers in particular, are expected to play in policy
contexts. Since the emergence of STS, there has been an “activist” strand
(Sismondo 2010) that has aimed to positively influence interactions
between science, technology, and society (Bijker 2003; Rip 1999). There
has also been a call for more “socially robust” science (Nowotny, Scott, and
Gibbons 2001), one that is “both more democratically and more technically
warranted” (Webster 2007, 460, emphasis in original). Commentators have
pointed to a “normative turn” in STS (Lynch and Cole 2005) and many STS
scholars have found themselves “in the policy room,” as Webster (2007) put
it. The introduction to the 2008 STS Handbook noted that the field could, in
recent times, be “characterized by its engagement with various publics and
decision makers” (Hackett et al. 2008, 1).
However, the terms on which we are allowed entry in the policy room are
not always the terms on which we would like to be engaged. In many
instances, as Wynne (2007, 493) notes, the situation arises where “social
science is required to deliver the Holy Grail of public acceptance for what-
ever technoscience might throw up.”Webster (2007, 475) suggests that STS
analysis can help to challenge what Latour (1993) has labeled
“purification:” the attempt to separate the “scientific” from the “political.”
Webster (2007, 462) also points to the danger of “cooption and capture” and
emphasizes that “STS needs to retain its reflexive and critical edge” in
policy contexts. Hackett et al. (2008, 5) recognize that the normative turn
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is not an easy one and point out that “the core challenge remains: how to
bring the distinctive insights and sensibilities of STS into the analysis of
policy and the process of social change.”
The “normative turn” has methodological implications. In particular, as
Rip (1999, 76) points out, there is necessarily a “tension between distance and
engagement” in policy processes. In our case, in the years leading up to the
Synthetic Biology Roadmap, we had both been closely involved in collabora-
tions with synthetic biologists and engaged in diverse policy initiatives in this
field and continued to be involved afterward (Balmer et al. 2015). More
specifically, we were both members of the UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap
Coordination Group (hereafter SBRCG) and thus involved in the processes
we discuss in this paper. We are reluctant to call our involvement in the
roadmap “participant observation” because we did not attempt to put our-
selves in the position of those we were observing: we were not “outsiders”
trying to gain an “insider’s” perspective. Wewere engaged in what Gusterson
(1997, 116) calls “polymorphous engagement,” interacting with our research
participants across a number of sites and in different configurations. It is
important to acknowledge that there are significant power relationships
involved in the kinds of cross-disciplinary work we have been involved in,
as Rabinow and Bennett (2012) show. This complicates our situation and
raises important questions of methodology and research ethics. Anthropolo-
gists who call for a “critical repatriated anthropology” have discussed the
methodological and epistemological problems involved in investigating the
cultures of the powerful and speak of “researching up” when studying popu-
lations with more power than the researcher (Gusterson 1997; Nader 1974).
This up/down metaphor is however not well suited to our situation because
we were in some respects equal partners in the SBRCG. Overall, the diversity
of different collaborative arrangements and peer-type relationships we
engage in cannot be adequately described by in/out or up/down metaphors,
as we are entangled in multifaceted power relationships.
For example, natural scientists and engineers muster much greater finan-
cial resources than social scientists in terms of overall research funding;
however (at least in the UK during the period studied here), natural scien-
tists in certain fields, notably synthetic biology, are often required to include
social scientists in their grants to demonstrate to their funders and wider
publics that they are taking “ethical, legal and social implications” seriously
(Marris 2015). Issues clearly arise here about our complicity with such
research agendas, and some social science researchers, including some
within STS, take the position that maintaining critical distance means
avoiding any engagement in the processes being researched. Others,
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however, encourage STS to engage with the world of action in order to help
ensure that society’s understanding of science is “driven by the critical
stance of the STS movement” (Rip 1999, 78). We embrace the latter
approach but also heed Bijker’s (2003, 446) warning that “STSers can
contribute to making things, to changing the world. In doing so, they inevi-
tably will dirty their hands, for there is no free ride here”. We recognize that
by actively engaging in research and policy-making in and around synthetic
biology we chose to get our hands dirty, but we aimed to do this without
losing our critical stance. We are also keen to maintain our long-term
collaborative and polymorphous relationships with our synthetic biology
colleagues. This adds complication to our attempts, such as this paper itself,
to write about our experiences in the field. We are not alone in grappling
with these issues. Mosse (2006), for example, talks about how in conven-
tional ethnography a researcher exits from the field in order to write their
account. But in those circumstances where we are members of the profes-
sional and policy communities we study “[t]he relationships of the field
persist, the capacity to exit through writing is in question, and ethnographic
representations have become unavoidably part of the world that is studied”
(Mosse 2006, 937). Gusterson (1997, 117) similarly notes that when anthro-
pologists “study up,” often their research participants “will read and argue
with what is written about them” and this threatens to undermine the critical
force of the research. One response to this quandary is simply not to write
about our experiences and be satisfied to see our attempts to influence
policy as an impact of our research. But we believe that analysis of our
work in these policy arenas can make important contributions to STS
knowledge and scholarly practice. We therefore try to tread a delicate path
that simultaneously respects our ongoing participation in scientific, indus-
try, and policy processes around synthetic biology and enables us to draw
conclusions that we hope will be helpful to STS researchers as they increas-
ingly find themselves in similar policy rooms.
This leads to difficult issues of confidentiality and research ethics. Con-
fidentiality was never explicitly discussed at the SBRCG meetings, but
there was an unarticulated recognition that conversations were confidential,
or at least sensitive. We have decided to follow the Chatham House rule in
this paper. We do not attribute any specific comment or position to any
member of the SBRCG. Furthermore, although we do report on some
aspects of the meetings when this is important to our analysis, whenever
possible we draw on information that is either publically available or was
presented at public meetings. Finally, we have purposely waited several
years before publishing this paper. The UK now has a different government,
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most of the major policy players have moved on to different roles, and the
roadmap itself has been superseded by another document (SBLC 2016).
With these caveats in place, we now turn to the UK Synthetic Biology
Roadmap itself.
The UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap
Origins of the UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap
The UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap was initiated by the Technology
Strategy Board (TSB). The TSB was set up by the UK government in
2007 as its national innovation agency.2 It reported to the UK Government’s
Department for Business, Industry and Skills (BIS) and in 2011 its stated
goal was “to accelerate economic growth by stimulating and supporting
business-led innovation” (TSB 2011, 2). In 2011, BIS (2011, 10) stated that
TSB had identified synthetic biology as “a key emerging technology with
the potential to create a billion pound industry within the UK in the next
decade”. The identification of synthetic biology as a technology with great
market potential was central to the motivation for the roadmap. As we shall
see, this became something the roadmapping process simultaneously
needed to demonstrate and bring into being.
The SBRCG met for the first time in November 2011. The then Science
Minister David Willetts explained (Willetts 2012a):
I have asked leading researchers and business experts in a group chaired by
Dr Lionel Clarke of Shell to produce a synthetic biology roadmap to set out
the timeframe and actions to establish a world leading synthetic biology
industry in the UK.
Initial meetings were attended by representatives from two large multina-
tional firms, the two governmental agencies that fund synthetic biology
research (Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council
[BBSRC] and Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
[EPSRC]), UK Trade and Investment,3 and prominent scientists in synthetic
biology and related fields. In early February 2012, J.C. was invited to join the
group, on the basis that ethical, social, and legal areas of expertise were
unrepresented. She responded positively, saying she would like C.M. to act
as her deputy since she would not be able to attend all the meetings. In
practice, we both became members of the SBRCG. Membership involved
participating in the constitution of a shared reading list, two stakeholder
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workshops, and SBRCG meetings once every two weeks. Four meetings
were held between November 2011 and January 2012, before we joined, and
we attended the seven meetings held between February and May 2012. Most
of the meetings were held at the BIS Headquarters close to the UK Houses of
Parliament, where we were met with large publicity posters referencing the
Union Jack and proclaiming that “Innovation is Great (Britain).”
The final output was a 34-page report published in July 2012. The first
part briefly depicts the emergence of synthetic biology, and UK strengths in
related areas. The main body is composed of five themes: foundational
science and engineering, continuing RRI, developing technology for com-
mercial use, applications and markets, and international cooperation. A
vision of the future of UK synthetic biology is set out at the start, and the
report ends with a set of recommendations to realize this vision.
Key Framings
Going back to our first meetings, we found that joining a group when it had
already been running for three months meant that key framings had already
been set. We soon noticed three clusters of underlying assumptions that
structured the discussions: (i) public acceptability was a key problem to be
addressed; (ii) understandings of innovation followed a linear model; and
(iii) the role of synthetic biology was to promote jobs and economic growth.
We describe below how each of these played out in the context of the
SBRCG.
First, we immediately and repeatedly noticed how presumed public con-
cerns were a dominant topic in SBRCG discussions and how they were
thought of as a roadblock for innovation and business, an obstacle to be
surmounted. SBRCG discussions also frequently adopted a deficit-model
approach to public understanding of science: “the public” was represented
as a homogeneous mass that passively accepts or rejects a technology, and
rejection was assumed to be based on irrational fears. These ideas have been
challenged by decades of STS scholarship (Gregory and Miller 1998;
Wynne 1992). The second set of framing assumptions that dominated the
roadmapping process were linear models of innovation that have also been
critiqued by STS and innovation studies (Godin 2006; Latour 1987). The
innovation process was portrayed as an ineluctable upward progression
from “science and engineering” to “technology” to “applications” to
“market growth” (as depicted in figure 5 of the Roadmap, p. 15).
This was linked to the third assumption that the primary aim of the
roadmap was to promote jobs and economic growth and that this would
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be achieved through industrial development of synthetic biology. This focus
on economic growth and job creation was not surprising considering the
roadmap’s origins in BIS and the composition of the group reflected this.
Although the SBRCG had members from public funding bodies and uni-
versities, it was chaired by someone from Shell, had representation from
GlaxoSmithKline and UK Trade and Investment. All the members (our-
selves included) were closely associated with current developments in syn-
thetic biology, and there were no members from groups with critical views
on these developments. As a result of this shared assumption about the
importance of “jobs and growth,” economic values were given more weight
than public values throughout the roadmapping process. More fundamen-
tally, this precluded any discussion about whether jobs and growth should
be the main aim of synthetic biology and there was no perceived need to
generate any evidence to support the underlying belief that synthetic biol-
ogy could indeed generate significant job creation and economic growth.
The assumption that synthetic biology had the potential to deliver these
benefits even became embedded in the definition of synthetic biology used
for the roadmap (SBRCG 2012, 4):
Synthetic biology is the design and engineering of biologically based parts,
novel devices and systems as well as the redesign of existing, natural biolo-
gical systems. It has the potential to deliver important applications and
improve industrial processes—resulting in economic growth and job creation.
The first sentence of this definition had been commonly used elsewhere
(e.g., Royal Academy of Engineering 2009, 6), but the second was added
explicitly for the roadmap. The Chair of the SBRCG put this even more
succinctly in his presentation of the roadmap subsequent to its publication:
“Synthetic Biology may be defined not only in terms of what it is but also in
terms of what benefits it can deliver” (Clarke 2013, slide 2, emphasis in
original). This illustrates how synthetic biology became reified as a tech-
nology that will necessarily deliver promised (economic) goods, as long as
it is given appropriate support. In line with this economic emphasis, a key
justification for the roadmap was the prior TSB/BIS projection that syn-
thetic biology would create a 1 billion-pound market for the UK within a
decade. The roadmap cites, three times, a BCC Research (2011) prediction
of a US$10.8 billion global market for synthetic biology by 2016. This
report was prohibitively expensive (approximately £3,500) so it was not
circulated to SBRCG members, and we were not able to scrutinize the
methods used to generate this forecast. The roadmap did acknowledge that
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such assessments depend on the definition of synthetic biology and relevant
market sectors and that this assessment might not be accurate (SBRCG
2012, 8). But it was decided that the size of the future synthetic biology
industry only needed to be credible, since the figure could become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
It is worth noting that this framing of synthetic biology as a driver of
economic growth was not the only framing in circulation at the time. The
US-based BioBricks Foundation (n.d.), a not-for-profit organization that
was influential in the early development of synthetic biology (albeit not
in an official capacity like that of the Roadmap), had a strikingly different
vision that emphasized their own normative agenda:
Our mission is to ensure that the engineering of biology is conducted in an
open and ethical manner to benefit all people and the planet. We envision a
world in which scientists and engineers work together using freely available
standardized biological parts that are safe, ethical, cost effective and publicly
accessible to create solutions to the problems facing humanity. We envision
synthetic biology as a force for good in the world.
Our Contribution to the Roadmap
One of our earliest contributions to the roadmap was to introduce some
literature into the SBRCG’s reading list, including the McDowall (2012)
article cited above. Several members took note of his argument that road-
maps are “purposefully performative.” We also made small but significant
contributions to the definition of the vision used for the roadmap. As noted
above, an important component of roadmaps is a shared vision for the
hoped-for future development of a technology. For this roadmap, it was
decided that the first part of the vision was that synthetic biology should be
“economically vibrant.” We suggested, on the basis of the two stakeholder
workshops we had attended, that synthetic biology should not simply be
seen as “economically vibrant” but also “diverse and sustainable.” Another
key component of an early version of the vision was that synthetic biology
should be “widely publicly supported: within an effective and responsive
regulatory framework.” We argued for the phrase “widely publicly
supported” to be changed to “of clear public benefit,” to shift the onus from
the public to support the technology onto those developing the technology
to demonstrate its benefits. Both our suggestions were incorporated into the
vision.
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Our biggest contribution to the report, however, was in the chapter we
were asked to lead on. In an early draft this was called “acceptability,”
demonstrating the dominant assumption in the SBRCG that an overriding
issue in the development of synthetic biology was to generate public accept-
ability. To shift the focus away from this assumption, we suggested the
chapter should be renamed “Responsible Research and Innovation” (RRI), a
term that was just beginning to emerge at that time in UK research funding
institutions and at the European Commission. The concept was enthusias-
tically adopted by the SBRCG and became one of the five themes of the
roadmap. It was also incorporated into the final version of the third com-
ponent of the vision, which reads (SBRCG 2012, 4):
Our vision is of a UK synthetic biology sector that is [ . . . ] of clear public
benefit: an exemplar of responsible innovation, incorporating the views of a
range of stakeholders and addressing global societal and environmental chal-
lenges within an effective, appropriate and responsive regulatory framework.
We felt that reframing our contribution to the roadmap in terms of RRI had
several advantages. First, we hoped the term would encourage attention to
the entire process of innovation, including research at the laboratory bench,
rather than being primarily concerned with downstream applications and
their impacts, which is where scientific and policy communities often
assume that “ethical, legal, and social issues” (ELSI) start to become rele-
vant. Second, we wanted to steer the SBRCG away from issues of “public
acceptability” and associated deficit model assumptions. Third, we hoped
the concept of RRI would help shift the focus away from concerns about
health and environmental risks and their regulation, which were key topics
in the chapter outline we were given. Through this intervention, we sought
to shift the deliberations away from simply attempting to predict and man-
age risk to focus instead on the motivations and purposes driving research.
Our proposed chapter title was embraced as a good idea by the rest of the
group, and we were given the freedom to draft text for this section. Given
our STS-informed belief that all discussions about the future are necessarily
normative, we were keen to stress the importance of opening up to diverse
groups, purposes, visions, and trajectories. Thus, in the sections of the
chapter we wrote, we made the point that (SBRCG 2012, 21):
“engagement” means genuinely giving power to a wide range of diverse
social groups, including those who will be the end users or presumed bene-
ficiaries of the technologies, taking their concerns seriously, and enabling
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them to participate throughout the whole pathway of technological
development.
We also wrote that “it is essential for debates to go beyond the community
of experts to open up discussions about the purpose of innovation” (SBRCG
2012, 19).
Approximately half of the text in the final version of Theme 2 in the
roadmap is our own (all of page 19 and some of page 21). However, a
number of subtle decisions were made in the final stages of the production
of the report that had a significant effect on the meaning of our text. Three
examples illustrate this.
First, the word “continuing” was added to the title of the chapter (which
became “Continuing Responsible Research and Innovation”) because there
was a worry that without this additional word there would be an implication
that research and innovation in synthetic biology had previously been irre-
sponsible, and this would raise public concerns. For similar reasons, two
boxes (written by other members of the group) were inserted into the chap-
ter to highlight existing positive practices. The first box (p. 20) described a
public consultation exercise organized by UK research funding bodies
(BBSRC and EPSRC) in 2010. The second box (p. 21) outlines the “checks
and balances” in place at BBSRC to ensure that “the researchers it funds are
aware of any ethical and social issues that their research raises, and they
respond to them appropriately.” While the initiatives described in these two
boxes are relevant, the text in the boxes reveals assumptions that are incon-
sistent with our framing for the chapter.
Both boxes aim to reassure the reader that UK research institutions are
already dealing adequately with any social and ethical issues raised by their
research. But the interpretation of what counts as legitimate “issues” is
narrower than our own interpretation, based on STS scholarship. The exam-
ples of ethical issues given in the second box (the need to use animals in an
experiment or the potential for misuse) do not address the issue of the
purpose of the research.4 The box about the Public Dialogue speaks of the
“hopes and fears” of members of the public and focuses on the narrow issue
of whether participants were supportive of the research—thus bringing the
focus back toward public acceptability. And neither of the boxes speak
about opening up deliberations on these issues to a broad range of stake-
holders, as opposed to unspecific “members of the public.”
A second example of the way in which the meaning of our text was
reframed was that in the final layout of the report a prominent “public
acceptability” subheading was inserted into our text. The words that follow
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this are our own: “Public acceptability is widely recognised as a crucial
issue for synthetic biology, but it cannot be adequately dealt with through
communication aimed at reassuring the public” (p. 19). We started the
sentence with “public acceptability” because the phrase had come up
repeatedly in the stakeholder workshops and at SBRCG meetings, and in
many other scientific and policy arenas we had participated in, so we
thought it had to be acknowledged and addressed. But in our text, we had
tried to shift the understanding of “public acceptability” away from a focus
on “hopes and fears” of members of the lay public and their supposed
concerns about environmental and health risks and ethical issues. We drew
on the results from the BBSRC/EPSRC Dialogue mentioned in the box to
illustrate how participants were concerned about the purpose of the research
and decision-making processes within research institutions. Changing the
chapter title from “Acceptability” to “responsible research and innovation”
was intended to signal and enact this shift, but the introduction of the two
boxes and the subheading pulled the focus back to a narrower understanding
of the societal dimensions of research.
The third example is that, in the summary of the themes, Theme 2 on RRI
is described as “the recognition that the ground-breaking opportunities and
benefits arising from synthetic biology also come with the potential for
unintended consequences, which can be avoided through awareness, train-
ing and adherence to prevailing regulatory frameworks” (p. 16). As a result,
RRI was essentially reduced to adherence to existing risk regulations, which
was exactly what we had been seeking to move away from by introducing
the concept in the first place. Indeed, the second part of theme 2, which we
did not write, was devoted to risk regulation (pp. 20, 21). In these ways, the
report failed to recognize the inescapable uncertainty discussed in the intro-
duction to this paper that is key to our understanding of the governance of
technologies.
It is also telling that the word “responsible” occurs only once in the short
summary of the five recommendations of the report. This is in the third
recommendation, that states the need to “Invest to accelerate technology
responsibly to market” (p. 32). Thus, the term is used here within a recom-
mendation that makes it seem as if only commercial outcomes are to be
valued, when our aim had been to introduce a broader perspective.
The emphasis on accelerating technological and commercial develop-
ment ties into what Joly, Rip, and Callon (2010) call the “tyranny of
urgency,” based on a narrative of global competition, and the fear of lagging
behind other nations. Joly, Rip, and Callon (2010) note that in a context
where the focus is on future technological developments that are inherently
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uncertain “technoscientific promises start to function as a political order,
with a tyranny of urgency and naturalisation of technological progress.
Civil society is then taken into account only as the final and undifferentiated
passive recipient of innovation, and when resisting, labelled the enemy of
innovation” (pp. 26, 27). We experienced a similar sense of urgency in the
roadmapping process. A key motivation for the roadmap was the belief that
if the UK did not act fast to invest in synthetic biology and to deal with its
recalcitrant public, other countries would take the lead. This sense of
urgency was prevalent at SBRCG meetings, which were held every two
weeks. The roadmap was written with tight deadlines, which partially
explains why there was no time for collective deliberation about the text
for the summary and recommendations and why most members of the
SBRCG were not given a chance to review the final draft and proofs. The
report had to be published in time to feed into the next Comprehensive
Spending Review in the autumn of 2012.
In summary, despite our efforts, the overall impression given in the final
report is that risk regulation is the most desirable and useful form of gov-
ernance for the future of synthetic biology (with appropriate regulation
already in place), and public acceptability remains the key roadblock for
the commercialization of synthetic biology. We had explicitly sought to
challenge these notions in our discussions within the SBRCG and our text
for the report, but our meaning was reoriented through subtle decisions,
such as the insertion of boxes and a subheading, and the formulation of text
used in the executive summary and recommendations. These significantly
altered or obscured the intended meaning of our contributions. The end
result is that the concept of RRI is narrowed, diluted, and even turned into
something that undermines the points we were trying to introduce. Overall,
the final report is permeated with a traditionally dominant understanding of
the relationship (or rather separation) between science, technology, and
society that we explicitly sought to challenge.
We want to stress that we do not believe these decisions about the final
wording and layout of the report were deliberately devised to subvert our
arguments. We are aware that it is common practice for the Chair and/or a
subgroup of a committee to draft executive summaries and final recom-
mendations from reports drafted by expert groups. Moreover, we assume
that the SBRCG members who made the final decisions about the text and
layout of the report were unaware they were reframing RRI away from our
intended meaning. But the fact that this was probably inadvertent further
reveals the pervasiveness of dominant frames and underscores the difficulty
of challenging them effectively.
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More Diffuse Effects on Policy Spaces
There are some indications that our contributions to the roadmap may have
had some effects that are more aligned with our intentions. For example, in
a talk in July 2012, the BIS representative on the SBRCG maintained that
the involvement of social scientists had challenged and reshaped his depart-
ment’s thinking. He explained that, previously, they had only considered
the scientific risks to human health and the environment in their work but
now they were considering incorporating broader social concerns. He
added: “[t]hat would be a cultural change for us, moving away from our
comfort zone of looking at scientific considerations only, to looking at
much wider societal issues. We call this responsible innovation.” He then
went on to say of the SBRCG (Uffindel 20125):
[s]omething we’ve done that is perhaps slightly different from what we’ve
done in the past is to be more involved with social scientists in the process
right from the outset. That’s made a real difference to actually how we’re
thinking as a group, and how we’ve begun to think within government itself.
This suggests we may have had some positive influence on the way some
participants in the roadmapping process felt about the involvement of social
scientists in policy, although it clearly differs from our own perception of
our limited influence.
Repercussions of the Roadmap
A Successful Roadmap with Limited Legitimacy
The roadmap led to substantial investment in synthetic biology. In 2013, the
UK government announced £126M funding for a “Synthetic Biology for
Growth Programme” which it described as an implementation of the Road-
map recommendations (BBSRC 2013); and synthetic biology was identi-
fied by the UK Government as one the “Eight Great Technologies in which
Great Britain is set to be a world leader” (BIS 2013a). Many of the funding
announcements were made byWilletts himself, culminating in his speech at
SB6.0 in July 2013 mentioned at the start of this paper, where he declared
that “the roadmap has been an invaluable guide to public policy since it was
produced.”
Thus, the roadmap was a success, in that it has served to legitimate
further funding and visible political support for synthetic biology. It was
published at an important moment for the development of synthetic biology
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in the UK, enabling it to establish itself as an independent field. The road-
map became a reference point around the world, a demonstration of the
UK’s leadership in synthetic biology and of the government’s support (see,
e.g., Joyce, Mazza, and Kendall 2013).
But the legitimacy of the roadmap and of the vision for the future it
embodies is limited to actors who share a particular, dominant, vision of the
relationship between science, innovation, and society that we sought to
challenge in our work on the SBRCG. The fact that others do not share this
vision was illustrated by leaflets distributed by protestors within and outside
the SB6.0 auditorium in July 2013, including the image of the tentacled
monster described in the Introduction. So this roadmap is an example of
what McDowall (2012, 535) describes as a “confident, prescriptive road-
map developed on the basis of a subset of relevant (and powerful) actors
[that] will have most influence.” A more inclusive and participatory process
that was more open to diverse and contested pathways may have had a
greater claim to setting out a legitimately desirable future pathway. The
future of synthetic biology may have looked different, but it may also have
been more viable and socially robust.
The Synthetic Biology Roadmap as a Catalyst for UK RRI
The roadmap can be seen a significant marker in the emergence of a
discourse around the concept of RRI in the UK, with the concept heavily
influenced by STS scholarship. In his Forward to the Roadmap, Lionel
Clarke, Chair of the SBRCG, stated: “Synthetic biology has the potential
to increase prosperity and address some of the major challenges facing our
planet—but much work needs to be done, and it has to be done
responsibly” (p. 3). And in his official written response to the roadmap,
Willetts stated (2012b) “the Roadmap rightly defines the development of
responsible innovation in this field as a key component.” RRI became, by
2013, a central part of the discourse of UK research councils and was
incorporated into funding calls for synthetic biology in the following
years. The roadmap was mentioned as the justification for this (e.g.,
BBSRC 2013), although it is important to recognize the reciprocal influ-
ences between our work on the SBRCG and other parallel discussions at
the EPSRC and the European Commission, which included other STS
scholars (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013; Owen, Macnaghten, and
Stilgoe 2012). The EPSRC (2013) published its “framework for respon-
sible innovation” in October 2013. This framework is derived from the
work of Owen, Stilgoe, and Macnaghten, but the acknowledgments also
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mention the Synthetic Biology Roadmap and refer specifically to page
19 of the Roadmap, which is the page containing our most significant
contribution.
At the same time, however, we observed how easily STS insights
were erased when it came to investment decision-making that was jus-
tified through promissory discourses. The word “responsible” did not
appear in Willetts’ speech at SB6.0, nor in the BIS (2013b) press release
that accompanied it. Instead, we heard the eminently quotable and
tweetable catchphrase about synthetic biology’s potential to “heal us,
heat us and feed us,” which had previously been used by then UK
Chancellor George Osborne (2012). Indeed, despite Willetts’s identifi-
cation of RRI as “a key component” in the development of synthetic
biology in his official response to the roadmap, the word “responsible”
did not appear at all in the series of BIS press releases announcing
further funding for synthetic biology in 2012–2015. The roadmap is
predominantly used in these press releases as a basis to confirm the
promissory nature of synthetic biology as a field that “could provide
solutions to the global challenges we face and offers significant growth
opportunities in a range of important sectors from health to energy”
(BIS 2012). In the end and despite our efforts, the roadmap contributed
to solidifying existing framings of synthetic biology as a driver of jobs
and economic growth for “UK Plc” (a term that was routinely used in
SBRCG discussions and is mentioned in the report, p. 27) and RRI was
interpreted as a means to smooth this path.
Discussion: Challenges for STS in Policy
Reflecting on our experiences with the Synthetic Biology Roadmap, we
now return to Hackett et al.’s question of how to bring the distinctive
insights and sensibilities of STS into policy. In the Introduction, we iden-
tified three STS insights we believed were relevant for our work on the
Synthetic Biology Roadmap: (1) the future of technological development is
unpredictable, making it necessary to act while acknowledging uncertainty,
(2) discourses about the future of technology are performative, and (3)
technological visions of the future embody value judgments, meaning that
it is important to have discussions of visions, values, and purposes in the
present. Did our involvement in the SBRCG help embed these insights into
the Roadmap?
With respect to the first STS insight on the unpredictability of techno-
logical futures, there was no adoption of what Jasanoff calls “technologies
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of humility,” which she defines as “institutionalized habits of thought, that
try to come to grips with the ragged fringes of human understanding—the
unknown, the uncertain, the ambiguous, and the uncontrollable” (Jasanoff,
2003, 227). Or, to put it in Collingridge’s (1980) terms, no move toward a
“theory of decision making under ignorance.” Instead, uncertainty was
essentially reduced to risk, and risk was in turn assumed to be quantifiable
and manageable, and already adequately dealt with through existing risk-
based regulatory frameworks.
With respect to the second STS insight, the roadmapping process we
were engaged in illustrated the conflation of expectations, desires, and
promises that McDowall (2012) notes is a general feature of roadmaps.
We have shown how the SBRCG took on board the performative nature
of the roadmapping process, but only in a strategic sense. We saw how a
particular vision of the future solidified and how this then had material
consequences, in the form of government investment in synthetic biology.
This was a classic example of promissory work, whereby discourse shapes
material circumstances, and actions in the present are made legitimate
through promises about the future (Brown 2003).
The third STS insight, the notion that visions of the future embody value
judgments, was not acknowledged during the roadmapping process. The
technological vision expressed through the roadmap embodies a narrow set
of values; and there was no space for consideration of alternative visions for
the future of synthetic biology. Although we inserted text in the report that
argued for stakeholder engagement to open up visions and decisions to
diverse social groups, the only groups involved in the roadmapping process
were from science, industry, and policy. The need for wider stakeholder
engagement, openness, and transparency as part of a proposed Synthetic
Biology Leadership Council was mentioned in the recommendations, but
the Leadership Council that was established subsequent to the roadmap
included only a narrow range of actors. Overall, we had hoped, like Stilgoe,
Owen, and Macnaghten (2013, 1570), that RRI could “extend the govern-
ance discussion to encompass questions of uncertainty (in its multiple
forms), purposes, motivations, social and political constitutions, trajectories
and directions of innovation” and thus enable a new form of governance
more in line with STS insights. But these hopes were not fulfilled and our
overriding experience was that of dominant framings persistently reassert-
ing themselves. This explains our despondency at the SB6.0 conference
described at the start of this paper.
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Interlocked Layers of Entrenched Framings
Our experiences were similar to Wynne’s (2007) in a food policy context.
He explains (p. 497):
I was utterly unable to diversify existing entrenched ideas about innovation
and future expectations. My attempts in this case woefully failed to have the
policy team involved step backwards and reflexively question some key
taken-for-granteds as a precondition for more robust (and perhaps substan-
tively different) advancement.
Challenging such “taken-for-granteds” is, in our experience, much harder
than taking part in a controversy with diverse but explicit points of view;
and this is the greatest challenge faced by STS in policy. A similar conclu-
sion was reached by an expert report on emerging technologies from the
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012, 66), which argues that dominant
framings “are rendered so invisible and unaccountable that the idea of
questioning them does not suggest itself and might even appear absurd.
Alternatives are deleted not by argument or by force but by the circumscrib-
ing of imagination itself.”
But why are these framings so entrenched? Even when alternative argu-
ments are put forward and appear to be heard, why do they seem to have no
lasting effects? We think this resistance to change is built upon four inter-
locked layers of assumptions about relationships between science and soci-
ety that reinforce one another in a cumulative manner like the layers of an
onion. These layers are (1) the ELSI model of social scientific engagement,
(2) the technocratic model of risk, (3) the deficit model of public under-
standing of science, and (4) the linear model of innovation. Each of these
layers of assumptions acts to push the “social” outside of the realm of the
“scientific,” and all of them were at work in the Synthetic Biology Road-
map. Addressing one set of assumptions alone can only scratch the surface
because each layer builds on the others.
The outer layer of the onion is the ELSI model assumption that social
science contributions to natural or physical science programs focus only on
“consequences” or “implications” of the research, which are thought of as
separate from the scientific and technical work. It is also assumed that
concerns of the public focus on such downstream issues. This leads to the
conclusion that ELSI work can be conducted in isolation from scientific
research and that it is primarily focused on public acceptability. The next
layer is the technocratic model of risk, where all concerns about a
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technology are subsumed to concerns about health and environmental risks,
and it is assumed that risks can only be legitimately addressed through
scientific methods and institutions. From this perspective, it becomes nec-
essary to rectify mistaken understandings of science, or of risk, present
among an amorphous group conceived of as “the public,” through better
communication. Underlying this is the pipeline model of innovation, which
assumes that scientific research progresses in a linear fashion from “basic”
to “applied” research and then “development,” until a “product” is ready to
be deployed in the social world, often reduced to “the market” (apparent in
figure 5 of the Roadmap, p. 15). This model places scientists at the center of
the process and assumes that other actors in innovation systems play no
significant role in the development of products. End users are seen only as
consumers who can either adopt or reject particular technologies. At the
core of the onion is the conception of “science” as separate from “society,”
with “impacts,” “consequences,” “applications,” or “products” generated
by science and moving out into society. This is a version of Latour’s (1993)
notion of “purification”—the ongoing attempt to separate the “scientific”
from the “social/political.”
Open-ended STS Involvement in Policy?
This diagnosis leads us to agree with Wynne (2007, 499) that in our policy
engagements we are facing a “deeply entrenched cultural condition” and
not “a deliberately and rationally decided response to counter-evidence.”
Wynne concludes that “[i]t is hard to see how anything but a long-term,
open-ended involvement by STS can address this”. But can STS researchers
really commit to such an open-ended involvement? And what would this
mean in practice? How many STS researchers need to engage with policy?
And for how long? Do we have to fight the same battles repeatedly, and if
so, how can we do so without feeling ineffective, burning out, or neglecting
other work? Our involvement in the roadmap was time-consuming, frus-
trating, and is not well recognized by traditional academic reward struc-
tures. Given such terms of engagement, why participate in such ventures?
Also, what constitutes success in STS engagements with policy? Should
we be happy with getting a few paragraphs into a policy report? Should we
reconcile ourselves to incremental steps? Perhaps the fact that we were
invited to be part of the SBRCG and that we introduced RRI into the
roadmap should be regarded as a success—a reflection of the progress STS
has made. But are such incremental steps enough if they are simply sub-
sumed into dominant framings? Should we expect more radical change? For
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example, in our involvement in the roadmap, should we have been more
forceful about presenting alternative visions for synthetic biology, such as
the one put forward by the BioBricks Foundation? Should we have insisted
on participation from a broader range of stakeholders? Should we have even
joined the SBRCG at all? We are aware that because we did join and
attempted to influence policy from within, we are implicated, and even
complicit, in the whole process. What does this mean for our responsibility
toward the roadmap and the ways in which it has subsequently been inter-
preted and implemented? Should we even have written this paper and how
much are we entitled to say? We do not have easy answers to any of these
questions, but we raise them because they are live issues for STS research-
ers who engage with policy.
It is also important to recognize that not all policy rooms are the same.
The roadmap is one of the most high-profile policy initiatives in UK syn-
thetic biology to date, but we feel that our engagements in other policy
rooms have been more productive. These engagements have been sustained
over the longer-term and they have not been driven by such a politicized
agenda or demanded predefined deliverables. We have also had a diverse
range of experiences in synthetic biology beyond the policy room in
research projects, teaching, and experimental art/science collaborations,
many of which have been marked by productive interactions between STS
researchers and other groups (Balmer et al. 2015; Calvert and Schyfter
2017). But what we have learnt from our involvement in the SBRCG is
that the initial conditions of STS involvement matter, and in this policy
room, the conditions were particularly constraining. We were brought in
late, after the framings had already been set, to write a document in a very
short time scale, the purpose of which was to legitimize the funding of
synthetic biology within the commercialization-oriented context of the
Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills. Our involvement was very
much downstream; we had no influence on broader structures and norma-
tive frameworks.
In our experiences with this roadmap and with the field of synthetic
biology more generally, we became sensitized to the language of
“roadblocks.” For example, at the SB6.0 conference in London, one
question raised by the organizers was: “What are the potential road-
blocks which will stop synthetic biology becoming industrially success-
ful and how can these be overcome?” The discussion quickly turned to
the need to avoid public opposition of the kind encountered by geneti-
cally modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture (Shukman 2013). Here,
as with many other so-called emerging technologies, we see the idea of
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synthetic biology as a juggernaut, determinedly pursuing its singular
path and treating everything else (recalcitrant publics and critical
NGOs) as roadblocks obstructing its progress toward the Emerald City
of industrialization, growth and jobs. This is very different from our
interpretation of RRI, and from Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe’s
(2012, 758) formulation of the key question driving RRI: “what kind
of future do we want innovation to bring into the world?”. This question
challenges us to acknowledge the multiplicity of possible futures in the
development of any technology and underlines the point we tried and
failed to convey in our involvement in the SBRCG: that there is more
than the one road that this particular juggernaut is set on taking. It is
possible to ride in a different vehicle, perhaps take a bike, or even walk
instead, and leave the main road for less-trodden paths.
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Notes
1. The Shell logo presumably represented Lionel Clarke, Chair of the SBRCG, who
was employed by Shell at that time.
2. The Technology Strategy Board was renamed Innovate UK in 2014.
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3. UK Trade and Investment is a government department (renamed Department for
International Trade in 2016) whose aim is to “drive the government’s policy of
increasing the number of exporters and inward investors to the UK” (UK Gov-
ernment n.d.).
4. Claire Marris has written elsewhere about how the focus on the “misuse” of the
so-called dual use research such as synthetic biology is misplaced and fails “to
take into account broader institutional, political and societal dimensions of
‘responsible innovation’ that come to the fore from an STS perspective” (Marris,
Jefferson, and Lentzos 2014, 408).
5. Transcribed by authors from video recording.
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